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Abstract
We consider a simple model of international trade under uncertainty, where
production takes time and is subject to uncertainty. The riskiness of production depends
on the choices of the producers, not observable to the general public, and these choices
are influenced by the availability and cost of credit. If investment is financed by a
bond market, then a situation may arise where otherwise identical countries end up
with different levels of interest and different choices of technique, which again implies
differences in achieved level of welfare. Under suitable conditions on the parameters
of the model, the market may not be able to supply credits to one of the countries.
The introduction of financial intermediaries with the ability to control the debtors
may change this situation in a direction which is welfare improving (in a suitable sense)
by increasing expected output in the country with high interest rates, while opening up
for new problems of asymmetric information with respect to the monitoring activity of
the banks.
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1. Introduction
One of the great challenges of the Latin American economies in the era of globalization
is to secure healthy financial institutions which may attract both local and foreign capital
to domestic investments. The negative consequences of many of the policies which have
been predominating in the latter years have been pointed out in the debate, for example in
connection with the economic crisis in Argentina (cf. e.g. Mussa (2002), Ferrer (2003))
The problems connected with capital outflow have been investigated also from a
theoretical viewpoint (see e.g. Tornell and Velasco (1992), Collier, Hoeffler and Patillo
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(2001)). It may be argued, as indeed it has been, that many of the problems reside in
the banking sector of the less developed countries, which may not be adapted to the
actual situation of free capital movements. However, it may be argued that the working
of the banking sector in the context of international trade and finance is not very well
understood, or at least it is only sparsely treated in the literature, which largely stays within
the framework of perfect foresight and perfect competition. Yet banks as such owe their
existence to imperfections of the competitive mechanism, due to uncertainty combined with
asymmetric information and the consequent lack of markets for all contingent commodities.
Over the last decades, considerable progress has been made in direction of achieving
a better understanding of how banks function in a closed economy; the work by e.g.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Leland and Pyle (1977), Diamond (1984) have pointed
to fundamental roles of banks as providing liquidity insurance, counteracting adverse
selection, or monitoring debtors (for a survey of the field, see Freixas and Rochet (1998)).
A common feature of all these approaches is that the uncertainty pertaining to intertemporal
transactions is an important feature which, combined with some aspects of asymmetric
information, results in equilibrium behaviour which differs from that of a perfectly
competitive economy, even with uncertainty taken into account. Since the presence of
asymmetric information takes us from the first-best world of competitive equilibrium to
that of market failures and second-best equilibria, we must expect that improvement does
not always result from conventional policy measures; indeed we shall argue that some of
the problems connected with capital outflow and scarcity of capital might be tackled by
strengthening domestic banking, which otherwise might look like a step backwards from
overall free international capital movements and competition in financial markets.
In the present paper, we investigate the role of banks – or rather, one of their roles,
since, as mentioned above, modern banking theory suggests many different roles – in a
model with several countries and free trade, not only in commodities but also in bonds, so
that we come as close as possible within the simple framework of the model to real world
situation of globalized capital markets. The model is deliberately kept very simple; we do
not aim to study commodity trade patterns but aim only at studying the way in which a
financial intermediary may make a difference. As it turns out, a financial intermediary may
improve the situation of a country treated adversely in the global financial equilibrium.
The intuition behind the model is as follows: We consider a world where firms can
invest in risky or less risky projects, where the latter give a smaller output but with a
smaller probability of failure than the former, and with a higher average result. The public
can observe whether the firm fails or not but the choice of technique is known only to the
firm. If firms finance their investment over the money market issuing bonds, then bonds
may be distinguished according to country of origin, and consequently, an equilibrium
may occur where one country’s firms must pay a higher price for their investment than
the other country, resulting in more risky projects being chosen and expected production
being lower. This situation is an example of what is known in the literature as welfare-
diminishing international trade (cf. Newbery and Stiglitz, 1984).
The introduction of financial intermediaries or banks with the ability to monitor firms’
choices of investment projects may considerably remedy this disadvantage, since banks
may provide loans to the firms against bonds sold in the market on equal conditions with
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those issued by the other country; consequently, credit is only marginally more expensive
(by the amount of the monitoring cost) in this country, and indeed the banks achieve a
general improvement of welfare (most markedly in the country which was at a disadvantage
in the original equilibrium, but also to some extent spreading to the rest of the world).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the model and we
discuss the basic moral hazard problem in the choice of investment by firms. This is carried
further in Section 3, where we add a consumption sector and consider the international
equilibria which obtain in the model. This section also contains our first main result about
disadvantageous free trade, showing that there are equilibria where the countries, though
identical in their economic characteristics, are treated differently, with one of the countries
subject to capital outflow. The following Section 4 introduces financial intermediaries
with the ability of monitoring the firms’ investment policies, and this is shown to have a
positive effect on welfare since (expected) production increases; in addition production
increases in the adversely affected country as its capital outflow is reduced.
In Section 5, we discuss some extensions of the model, adding national labor markets
and considering the role of capital stocks in international credit. Finally we conclude in
Section 6 with a discussion of the insights obtained as well as some directions of future
research suggested by the results.
2. The model: Choice of technique and financing investments
In the present section, we introduce the basic model, starting with the choices of
investment. Our model is one of two countries which are followed over two periods, 0 and
1. In the first period, the firms choose an investment which has the form of a commodity
input in a suitably chosen technique, and in the second period, the resulting output is
obtained and sold. In our model, the investment decision consists of two parts, namely
(1) choice of technique of production, and (2) quantity of input (and, assuming efficient
production, output).
Since the main point of introducing the model is to show that technologically identical
countries may end up in very different positions as a result of the financial institutions, we
assume that the techniques to be chosen are the same in the two countries. Also, and for the
same reason, we assume that the countries have the same number of identical consumers,
so that the asymmetries that will emerge are caused strictly by the institutions described
in the model.
We assume that there is only one good in the model, to be consumed in either of two
periods. Production is subject to uncertainty in the productive sector; there is a possibility
of failure of the investment project at time 1, depending on the choice of technique. While
success or failure is observable, the choice of technique is known only to the firm itself,
giving rise to a moral hazard problem.
We assume that in each firm, there are two distinct types of techniques G and B for
producing goods in period 1 from inputs in period 0; each of these is characterized by a
production function γj : R+ → R, j ∈ {G, B}, describing the output to be obtained from
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a given input if the project succeeds; in case of failure, the output is 0; the production
functions are assumed to be differentiable and concave, so that there is decreasing returns
to scale in investment.
The successes or failures of the projects are formalized as follows: There are three
states of nature in period 1, s = 1, 2, 3, with associated probabilities π1, π2, π3, such that
both techniques succeed in state 1, only G in state 2, and none of them in state 3. In state
1, the technique B is superior to G in the sense that for each input m at period 0,
µBγB(m) ≥ γG(m), γB(m) ≤ λBγG(m), (1)
for parameters µB and λB satisfying
µB < 1, 1 < λB < 1 +
π2
π1
. (2)
A simple example of such a pair of techniques is that where γB(m) = λBγG(m) for all
m (and µB = λ−1B ); we have chosen the slightly more general formulation with a view to
the interpretation of the production function to be proposed in Section 5, but for the main
part of the paper, the simpler formulation is sufficient.
From (1) and (2) it follows that expected output in technique G exceeds that of
technique B; indeed, if input m is inserted, then expected output in G is (π1 + π2)γG(m)
and expected output in B is
π1γB(m) ≤ π1λBγG(m) < (π1 + π2)γG(m).
It should be noticed that the simple structure of uncertainty as formulated here means that
success or failure is something which hits all firms (in both countries) simultaneously,
being industry-specific rather than firm-specific. This structure has been chosen so as to
exclude asymmetries between economically ‘large’ and ‘small’ countries, relying on the
law of large numbers (cf. e.g. Keiding and Knudsen, 2003).
In order to finance the investment in inputs at period 0, firms may issue bonds (whether
or not the market will accept the bonds is a problem which will be looked into later) or
possibly use a bank. The bonds are to be repaid in period 1 if the investment succeeds; if
it fails there is no repayment. The bond market is characterized by a repayment rate R,
which is what the firm pays in case of success.
As it was mentioned above, we assume that only success or failure of the investment
is generally observable, but that the firms’ choices of technique cannot be observed by
others. This means that we have a problem of moral hazard: At the bond repayment rate
R, the firm will prefer G if expected profits (given that the input has been chosen optimally
for this technique) is better with G than with B:
max
m
[π1(p1γG(m)−Rm) + π2(p2γG(m)−Rm)] > max
m
[π1(p1γB(m)−Rm)], (3)
where ps is the (contingent) price of the commodity in state s, s = 1, 2, 3, and similarly,
technique B is chosen if
max
m
[π1(p1γB(m)−Rm)] > max
m
[π1(p1γG(m)−Rm) + π2(p2γG(m)−Rm)]. (4)
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Note that we have assumed that input chosen by the firm remains concealed to the general
public as well, since otherwise the input choice would reveal the choice of technique.
The incentive compatibility conditions in (3) and (4) mean that the choice of technique
depends on the current repayment rate in the bond market, so that firms may choose G
at low repayment rates and B at higher repayment rates. We shall exploit this fact in our
model when we introduce the two-country aspect which has not yet been used. Indeed,
we assume that bonds can be differentiated by the general public according to the country
of origin, so that bonds issued in the first country have repayment rate R and bonds issued
in the second country R∗.
Once we have two different repayment rates, there are several cases to investigate.
The repayment rates may be such that firms in both countries choose the same technique
which may be G or B; these cases are not particularly interesting, since the bonds will then
be considered as equal in the market, so that the two-country aspect disappears. However,
if the bond rates differ, say R < R∗, so that country 1 chooses G and country 2 B, then, as
we shall see in the next section, the countries will end up in very different positions even
if they were identical in their economic characteristics. Finally, it may be the case that the
bond market does not accept bonds issued in one of the countries, say country 2, opening
up for the activities of private banks, a possibility to be investigated in Section 4 below.
Before we proceed with the study of the situation with two different bond repayment
rates, we return to the choices of the firm in period 0 which involves not only a choice
of technique but also the level of operation of the technique, that is the input level which
maximizes intertemporal profits. For firms in country 1, having access to investment at
the repayment rate R the optimal choice of m is that for which expected profits
(π1p1 + π2p2)(γG(m)−Rm)
are maximal, so that optimal input level mR satisfies the first order condition
γ′G(mR) = R. (5)
For the firms in country 2 being exposed to repayment rate R∗ and choosing technique B,
we get the similar expression
γ′B(mR∗) = R
∗, (6)
so that
R∗
R
=
γ′B(mR∗)
γ′G(mR)
. (7)
Since in our one-good model the state contingent prices may be taken to be all equal, the
expression (7) and our assumption that R∗ > R tells us that
γ′B(mR∗) > γ
′
G(mR). (8)
For later use we state this trivial but useful result.
Proposition 1. Assume that γ′B(m) ≤ λBγ′G(m) for all m. If R∗ > R, then the
optimal input choices in country 1 and 2 satisfy mR > mR∗ .
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Summing up so far, the workings of the financial sector, which to this moment consists
only of a bond market, can – provided the equilibrium in the bond market results in
sufficiently different repayment rates for bonds originating in two countries – result in
one country choosing risky investment with lower expected productivity, and moreover
employing less input, than the other country choosing the less risky investment. As a result
the activity in the two countries will be different, and, as we shall see, with lower levels
of consumption in one country than in the other.
In the next section we shall show that the situation described is compatible with
equilibrium behaviour of consumer-savers in the two countries.
3. Consumer choice and equilibrium
In this section, we introduce the consumer demanding bonds for the purpose of
transfering value from period 0 to period 1. As it was mentioned above, we deliberately
keep the specification simple and identical in the two countries (something which by the
way is in line with classical trade theory as well) in order to focuss on asymmetries arising
from the financial institutions.
We assume that there are two types of consumers, savers and entrepreneurs, differing
in their endowment, each endowed with a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
u defined on consumption in period 1 (of the single commodity). The consumer-saver
has an initial endowment of 1 unit in period 0 and no access to production, whereas the
consumer-entrepreneur owns a firm, which in turn is described by the two techniques G
and B as discussed in the previous section. Since all consumers are alike and have the
same possibilities of choice, their number is not important, all that matters is their total
endowment, which we set to 1. In the following we investigate the representative consumer
having this endowment.
In the case of most interest, where there are two different types of bonds, with
repayment rates R and R∗, in the market, the consumer-saver (in either country) faces the
budget constraint
p1x1 ≤ Rz + R∗z∗, p2x2 ≤ Rz, z + z∗ = 1, x3 = 0,
where xs is the consumption in state s, for s = 1, 2, 3, and z and z∗ are the investments
in the bonds of country 1 and 2, respectively. The budget constraint of the consumer-
entrepreneur is rather trivial, since consumption in state s is given by the output in this
state minus repayment if output is positive.
In our simple case with no transfers between states, the prices in each state become
irrelevant, and we may as well set p1 = p2 = 1 so that the expressions are suitably
simplified.
Now we describe the equilibrium of the model. For this we need the demand for
bonds of the consumers performing saving, found as the values of z and z∗ = (1 − z)
which maximize expected utility
π1u (Rz + R∗z∗) + π2u (Rz) = π1u (Rz + R∗(1− z)) + π2u (Rz) , (9)
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to be equal to the supply of bonds. The first order condition for a maximum of (9) is
R∗
R
= 1 +
π2
π1
u′(x2)
u′(x1)
, (10),
assuming that the maximum is attained for z in the interior of [0, 1]. Conversely, since u
is concave, an interior solution of (10) entails that the consumer-saver will demand bonds
from both countries.
Conditions for this to occur is given in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that the production functions γG and γB satisfy the following
well-behavedness conditions:
(i) γ′j(0) ≥ Kγ′k(1), where K > (1 + π2π1 ), j, k ∈ {B, G}, j = k,
(ii) the function z 	→ zγ′(z) is continuous in [0, 1] with value 0 at z = 0.
If π2 is small, then there is an equilibrium with savings z0 such that 0 < z0 < 1.
Proof: Inserting the expressions x1 = Rz + R∗(1− z), x2 = Rz in (10) and using (7)
we get that
γ′B(1− z)
γ′G(z)
=
[
1 +
π2
π1
u′((π1 + π2)γ′G(z)z)
u′((π1 + π2)γ′G(z)z + π1γ
′
B(1− z)(1− z))
]
. (11)
Using (i) we have that for z = 0, the left-hand side of this expression is ≤ K−1 ≤
(1 + π2π1 )
−1
, which is smaller than 1, whereas the right-hand side may be assessed using
(ii), from which it follows that it takes a value ≥ 1. For z = 1 we use again (i) to obtain
that the left-hand side is greater than (1 + π2π1 ), whereas the right-hand side of (11) equals
(1 + π2π1 ).
By continuity there is z0 strictly between 0 and 1 such that equality obtains in (11),
showing existence of equilibrium where both types of bonds are demanded.
The assumption (i) in Proposition 2 connects the marginal products of the different
techniques taken in different input combinations. It will be satisfied if both production
functions exhibit sufficiently high marginal productivity at 0.
Our next task is to investigate the supply side of the bond market. For the two types
of bonds to exist simultaneously, we must have that firms in country 1 choose technique G
and firms in country 2 choose B. For this we need to check that the incentive compatibility
conditions (3) and (4) are satisfied; if this is the case, the supply of bonds as determined by
the choice of profit maximizing input-output combination in the chosen technique, should
match the savings condition.
Proposition 3. Assume that the parameters of the model satisfy:
(i) αγ′G(z) ≤
γG(1− z)
1− z , (ii)
γ′B(z)
z
≤ βγ′B(1− z)
for z ∈ [0, 1] satisfying (11), where the constants α, β are such that
α ≥ π2
π1(1− λB) + π2 , β ≤
π2
π1(µG − 1) + π2) .
Then the model admits an equilibrium with R < R∗.
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Proof: Suppose that R and R∗ together with mR and mR∗ satisfy (5) – (6) above.
We show first that firms in country 1 satisfy (3). Assume that input is fixed at mR∗ ;
then technique G is better than B at the repayment rate R if
(π1 + π2)(γG(mR∗)−RmR∗) > π1(γB(mR∗)−RmR∗)
or R < Rˆ∗, where
Rˆ∗ =
(π1 + π2)
π2
γG(mR∗)
mR∗
− π1
π2
γB(mR∗)
mR∗
.
Since γB(mR∗) ≤ λBγG(mR∗), we have that
Rˆ∗ ≥ π1(1− λB) + π2
π2
γG(mR∗)
mR∗
≥ π1(1− λB) + π2
π2
αγ′G(mR) = γ
′
G(mR),
where we have used (i). On the other hand, by (5) we have that R = γ′G(mR), and we
may conclude that R < Rˆ∗, so that technique G is better than technique B at the input
level mR∗ ; it follows that G is better than B when input level in G is chosen at mR, so
that (2) holds.
We show in a similar way that also firms in country 2 satisfy the incentive compatibility
condition. Define
Rˆ =
(π1 + π2)
π2
γG(mR)
mR
− π1
π2
γB(mR)
mR
.
Then technique B is better than technique G at input mR if R∗ > Rˆ. Since γG(mR) ≤
µBγB(mR), we get from (ii) that
Rˆ ≤ π1(µB − 1) + π2
π2
γB(mR)
mR
≤ π1(µB − 1) + π2
π2
βγ′B(mR∗) ≤ γ′B(mR∗) = R∗.
Reasoning as above we conclude that firms in country 2 satisfy the incentive compatibility
condition.
The assumptions on the production functions γj made in Proposition 3 relate average
and marginal products of the production functions; the properties (i) and (ii) should hold
when production is not too close to 0.
Using the results obtained we may now summarize the discussion in the following
main theorem.
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions stated in Propositions 1 – 3, there is an equilibrium
with two types of bonds having different repayment rates. This equilibrium is Pareto
inoptimal in the following strong sense: There is another allocation with no transfers of
commodities between countries which gives higher expected utility to every consumer in
every country.
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Proof: The existence of an equilibrium follows from Propositions 1 – 3: From
Proposition 2 we have that there are divisions of total savings into investments in the
two techniques and corresponding levels of repayment for which the consumers want to
hold both types of bonds, and from Proposition 3 we get that these repayment rates are
such that firms in country 1 choose technique G and firms in country 2 choose technique
B. Since the bond market and the market for inputs (which coincide in the model) are in
balance, we have an equilibrium with the desired properties.
To show the second part of the theorem, we notice that the allocation where the
endowment of each country is inserted in the production of the same country using
technique G results in higher expected utility for each consumer (saver or entrepreneur)
than the equilibrium with different bond types.
It should be noted that one of the distinctive features of the asymmetric equilibrium
is that some of the endowment in country 2 is taken to the country 1 for investment;
thus, we have an equilibrium with capital outflow. This happens even though the two
countries are absolutely equal with respect to their characteristics – they have the same
number of identical consumers and identical firms. This identity of the countries has of
course been assumed to stress that the asymmetry which occurs in the equilibrium is a
phenomenon brought about by the economic institutions rather than by objective causes
(it is a ‘sunspot’ phenomenon). Consequently, the institutions (which are the generally
approved institutions of liberalized trade and capital movements) need to be blamed, or
rather, need to be revised.
4. Financial intermediation
In this section, we consider the case where the bond market does not sustain two
types of bonds; this may happen if γ′B(0) is smaller than the smallest repayment rate R∗
for which the consumer will want to hold a bond giving R∗ in state 1 and nothing in the
other states. The lack of a market for bonds from firms in country 2 means that investment
in the country’s firms will not be forthcoming, so that output at period 1 as well as the
income of the consumer-entrepreneurs of this country is 0. All investment takes place in
country 1.
Following the suggestions of the contemporary microeconomic theory of banks, there
is in this situation room for another type of financial institution in country 2. This financial
intermediary (or ‘bank’) will obtain loans from the general public, possibly by issuing
bonds, and offer credits to firms in country 2; the new aspect of this situation is that the
financial intermediary has the possibility of monitoring the investment of the firm. We shall
assume that this monitoring may be carried out to different degree according to the choice
of the bank: To keep the model simple we assume that what is chosen is the proportion
ρ ∈ [0, 1] of firms to be controlled; if a firm is controlled, it will choose technique G
independent of the repayment rate R∗b which it has accepted with the bank; otherwise we
assume that R∗b is sufficiently high so that the firm will choose B. The cost to the bank of
controlling the proportion ρ of firms is ρc, where c > 0 is a constant.
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Denote by Rb the repayment rate offered to the consumer-savers. Given Rb and ρ,
the consumer-saver will choose the proportion z invested in bonds of country 1 so as to
maximize expected utility
π1u(Rz + Rb(1− z)) + π2u(Rz + ρRb(1− z)),
giving the first order conditions
Rb
R
=
π1u
′(x˜1) + π2u′(x˜2)
π1u′(x˜1) + ρπ2u′(x˜2)
, (12)
with x˜1 = Rz + Rb(1 − z), x˜2 = Rz + ρRb(1 − z), from which the demand for bank
bonds at repayment rate Rb may be found as 1− z. The rate R∗b which the bank proposes
to its debtors may then be found as the value of R∗b for which
ρmGR∗
b
+ (1− ρ)mBR∗
b
= 1− z,
where mGR∗
b
and mBR∗
b
are optimal input levels at repayment rate R∗b given that technique
G, respectively B, is chosen; these input levels satisfy
γ′G(m
G
R∗
b
) =
R∗b
π1 + π2
, γ′B(m
B
R∗
b
) =
R∗b
π1
. (13)
A profit maximizing bank will choose the decision variables Rb and ρ in such a way that
the expected profit
[(π1 + π2ρ)(R∗b −Rb)](1− z)− ρc
is maximal, where R∗b is found as solution to (11) – (13).
The question of whether a bond market for country 1 debt can coexist with a
monopolistic bank in country 2 is not entirely trivial. It is considered in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. Assume that
(a)
γ′B(0)
γ′G(1)
<
(
1 +
π2
π1
)
, (b) γ′G
(
1
2
)
≤ c
(
1 +
π1
π2
)
, and
(c) γ′G
(
1
4
)
− γ′G
(
3
4
)
≥ 4c
π1 + π2
.
Then there is no market for country 2 bonds, but there is an equilibrium with bond market
for country 1 and a profit maximizing bank in country 2. This equilibrium is characterized
by incomplete monitoring, 0 < ρ < 1.
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Proof: If bonds of country 2 enter the portfolio of the consumer-saver, then by (11) we
must have
γ′B(0)
γ′G(1)
≥ 1 + π2
π1
(there is a nonzero input level for firms of country 2 which is compatible with the repayment
rate at which country 2 bonds can be accepted by the savers). However, this contradicts
the assumption (a) of the proposition, and we conclude that country 2 bonds will not be
accepted.
Turning to the monopolistic bank in country 2, it has the option of choosing
ρ = 1 (perfect monitoring), so that all country 2 firms choose G. The bank will offer
the savers a repayment Rb = R and charge the debtors a repayment R∗b such that
(π1 + π2)(R∗b − R)mR∗b − c ≥ 0. Such a repayment R∗b exists, since the bank may
choose to have deposits of size mR∗
b
= 14 , which will be accepted at the rate R
∗
b = γG(
1
4 ),
and since z = 34 , the expected profit of the bank is
(π1 + π2)
[
γ′G
(
1
4
)
− γ′G
(
3
4
)]
1
4
− c
which is ≥ 0 by assumption (b).
We have shown that there is a decision (ρ, R∗b) at which the bank earns nonnegative
profits, and consequently (as the decision variables belong to compact intervals and the
profit function is continuous) there is a profit maximizing decision as well. We show
that the monitoring level ρ = 1 is not optimal (ρ = 0 is excluded since in that case the
consumer-savers will not place their savings with the bank). Indeed, from (12) we have
that
Rb = R
π1u
′(x˜1) + π2u′(x˜2)
π1u′(x˜1) + ρπ2u′(x˜2)
,
and differentiating at ρ = 1 we get that
∂Rb
∂ρ
= − Rπ2
π1 + π2
.
Thus, reducing ρ from the value 1 means that the bank will have to pay more to the savers
to retain the previous market share; however, it will also save monitoring cost of the size
c. Since R ≤ γ′G( 12 ) it follows that profits are increased if
γ′G
(
1
2
)
π2
π1 + π2
≤ c.
Since this inequality holds due to assumption (b), we have that ρ = 1 is not an optimal
choice of the bank.
In the setup considered here, where the financing of firms in country 1 is carried out via
the bond market, whereas the firms in country 2 use a financial intermediary, since the bond
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market will not accept country 2 bonds, it comes as no surprise that the credit allocation
established by the intermediary brings a Pareto improvement relative to the alternative
which is no credits at all in country 2. On the other hand, the monopolistic behaviour
of the bank gives rise to the usual distortions due to higher interest margin than what is
dictated by monitoring cost alone; this distortion results in smaller than optimal production
in country 2, larger than optimal production in country 1. It should be emphasized that
this is a loss which goes beyond the cost of monitoring debtors and it is strictly related to
monopolistic pricing behaviour.
There is however, another problem which has not been considered here, namely that
of asymmetric information with respect to the monitoring activity carried out by the bank.
It has been assumed throughout that savers know the (true) inspection rate ρ when making
their portfolio decisions. If however ρ is not generally observable, the bank may be tempted
to reduce its value, thereby saving monitoring cost; by the revelation principle, the only
possible inspection level would then be 0 in which case the bank would get no deposits.
5. Extensions of the model
The model which has been discussed in the previous sections has been designed
for the study of problems of capital flows under the conditions of liberalized trade and
capital movements. It may be argued that the two-country aspects of the model are not
very elaborated, since countries are only identified by the productive firms, which are
considered as non-transferable national identities, and from the distinction between debt
contracted by firms in one country and firms in another country which is derived from the
national character of the firms.
Apart from this, the two-country framework does not put limitations on the economic
activites of the agents; thus, the consumer-savers were behaved identically whether they
were situated in one country or another. On the other hand, most of the traditional features
of two-country models of international trade may be introduced into the model without
modifying the basic structure and the conclusions of the model. Thus, we may add another
type of consumer, namely consumers endowed with labor power, which is used as input in
the firms’ intertemporal production, giving rise to a wage paid out of the finished product.
These consumers are specific for the country and cannot migrate. To introduce this feature,
we need only to reinterprete the production functions fj(m) as
fj(m) = Fj(m, L), j ∈ {B, G},
where Fj(m, L) is a constant return to scale production function in the two productive
factors commodity and labor, and L is the total labor endowment, assumed to be identical
in the two countries. Now everything goes as before, with wages taking the place of the
profits of consumer-entrepreneurs.
Another feature which might be added to the model has to do with the belief structure;
in the preceding results, we have shown that asymmetric equilibria may arise but we have
not given any explanation of why they should arise. It should be remembered that the
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symmetric equilibrium, where each country invests 1/2 and where bonds, even if country-
specific, have the same price in the market, is also possible. Without further structure in
the model, we have only established that asymmetries may arise, not that they must arise.
Intuition taken from investment in third world countries will suggest that savers expect
more variance from such investment than from investment in projects in the home country;
third world investment is expected to be more risky, and in this situation our model explains
that these investments are indeed more risky, not because of some inherent features of third
world countries, but simply as a response to the higher interest rates following from these
expectations, which in this way become self-fulfilling. Still, some indication of what sets
this process off would improve the argument.
A possible way of explaining why such beliefs arise might be obtained if we introduce
own investment by firms. Assume that country 1 firms are able to finance some of their
production by own means, not resorting to the loan market, whereas country 2 firms either
do not have this possibility or at least are less well endowed with such capital. This means
that the countries are no longer absolutely identical, country 1 being richer than country
2, but otherwise they have access to the same technology, have identical labor endowment
etc. In this situation we must distinguish between country 1 and country 2 production
functions, with
γij(m) = Fj(m
i
0 + m, L)−mij , i = 1, 2, j ∈ {B, G},
where mi0 denotes the initial capital available in firms of country i. Thus, the production
function γ1j (m) gives the net output resulting from adding m to the already existing input
mi0, which of course has to be reestablished afterwards (if possible). We assume that if
a project fails, then all capital, own as well as borrowed, is lost, meaning that expected
profits of country 1 firms at bond repayment rate R becomes
ΠiG(m, R, m
i
0) = (π1 + π2)(γ
i
G(m)−Rm)− π3mi0,
if technique G is used, and
ΠiB(m, R, m
i
0) = π1(γ
i
B(m)−Rm)− (π2 + π3)mi0
in case of technique B.
We show that in this situation, the change of technique from G to B takes place at a
higher repayment rate, the higher the initial level of capital endowment.
Proposition 5. Assume that m10 > m20. If Rˆi is the repayment rate at which firms in
country i are indifferent between the two techniques, i = 1, 2, then Rˆ1 > Rˆ2.
Proof: Changing mi0 slightly at Rˆi we get
∂ΠiG
∂mi0
= (π1 + π2)(γiG)
′ − π3 = (π1 + π2)Rˆ− π3,
∂ΠiB
∂mi0
= π1(γiB)
′ − (π2 + π3) = π1Rˆ− (π2 + π3),
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which shows that ΠiG increases more than ΠiB when mi0 gets larger, from which the
conclusion follows.
The fact that the richer (in terms of firms’ initial investments) country is more likely
to choose G than the poorer country gives a rationalization of the asymmetric beliefs
which in their turn are sustained by asymmetric equilibria. However, the explanation has
the possible disadvantage of reducing the asymmetry to a phenomenon which is partially
explained by differences of endowments, or ‘comparative advantage in receiving credits’.
Still the model retains the main message that slow development in some countries may be
caused by the system of credit allocation rather than by specific circumstances of economic
or political nature.
6. Discussion
In the previous sections, we have developed a simple model of international credit
and investment, with uncertainty playing a crucial role; the choice of technique in the
investment projects is crucially dependent on the rate of interest, forcing countries exposed
to a high rate of interest to choose risky investments, thereby reinforcing the opinions of
the savers as to the creditworthiness of these countries. This may lead to a breakdown of
the simple bond market for investment in such countries, a situation which opens up for the
operation of banks which may offer credits to investors given that they monitor (partially
or fully) the behavior of the debtors. Thus, the banks fulfill a role in international finance
which cannot be performed by a competitive bond market.
Clearly, the model focuses on a particular aspect of banking, and its general
recommendation of enhancing the functioning of financial intermediaries should of course
be seen in this light; banking is in the present study synonymous with monitoring of credits,
and even so, the viability of the arrangement depends on whether the monitoring performed
by the banks is in accordance with the expectation of the public. Seen in this light the
results are compatible with possible negative effects of the banking sector in aggrevating
rather than alleviating crises (such as may have been the case in Argentina, cf. e.g. della
Paolera and Taylor (2003)).
It has been a main point of the model that the countries were identical at the outset, so
that eventual asymmetries in final allocation must be caused by the institutions rather than
by the underlying characteristics of the economies. In particular, instead of the asymmetric
equilibria there might have been a symmetric one, where both countries produced identical
amounts of goods and consumers enjoyed identical levels of utility (recall that in our
simple model, uncertainty is not country-specific, so it hits each country in the same way).
However, the market may result in the asymmetric situation, where too much is produced
in one country, too little in the other, and with the welfare reducing greater risk sustained
by the market (or, alternatively, by the financial intermediary).
Thus, the model may be considered as one way of explaining why standard trade
theory, according to which investment would flow towards the country exhibiting the
highest marginal productivity, does not predict the actual state of affairs very well. Marginal
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productivity may well be considerably higher in poor countries than in rich ones (where
interest rates by now are historically low), but the market mechanism cannot allocate
savings to their best purpose when uncertainty and information asymmetries are present.
Thus, the model shows that we have to take market failure into consideration also when
considering international capital markets, which are as much subject to market failure as
any other market.
The model does not point directly to what can be done to remedy the situation. On
one hand, a bank which fully monitors the investers in country 2 may indeed provide a
second best solution to the welfare maximization problem, but then the question arises
whether such a bank can be given the right incentive structure to support such a solution.
The model in its present version is probably too oversimplified to give answers to such
questions, which therefore remain topics for future research.
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